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W . M . M a th e w *
I. BOLIVAR
It is proposed here that the liberation which Simón Bolívar helped win 
for the northern territories o f South America was, in economic terms, 
particularly pronounced in the last decade o f his life and for at least a 
generation after his death in 1830. Free trade and British hegem ony seem 
not to have been ushered in with the defeat o f the royalist armies. I wish 
to assert this po in t at the outset, but no t to  engage in any p ro o f o f it. I do 
not believe it to be particularly controversial, as section three tries to 
make clear. Analysis instead will be confined to the com plex and ambiv­
alent issue o f the tariff and its contribution to  the independence o f  the 
Bolivarian republics before 1850.
Bolivar had considerable respect and adm iration for Britain and seemed 
at times to  be willing an im m ediate imperialist succession.1 In Jo hnson ’s 
view he was “remarkably constant in his confidence that the British held 
the key to political and econom ic happiness,” enthusiastically conceding 
to them  a variety o f useful privileges (Johnson and Ladd 1968: 82-83). 
This, however, ought no t to be taken too  far. O bservations about Brit­
ain’s “irresistible ascendancy” and America becom ing free “in England’s 
shadow ” carried as much realpolitik as they did amity. Britain was the 
com ing power, and the cause o f  independence in the Americas needed 
her active support in Europe. Realism, moreover, could shade into fatal­
ism, Bolivar writing in 1822 o f a continent “encircled by the floating for­
tresses o f  foreigners who are therefore enemies.” The English “desire to
* I am grateful to Dr. Bill Albert and Dr. Shaun Hargreaves-Heap for reading drafts of 
this paper and offering me much excellent advice. As the original Spanish versions of 
a few documents have not been available I have, for the sake of consistency, used Eng­
lish translation throughout.
1 See articles in Gaceta de Caracas (Caracas, Feb. 2 and June 9,1814) in Lecuna and 
Bierck (1951,1: 70, 79) and quotation in Trend (1951: 164).
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lay dow n the law to us and [...] ultimately will.”2 It would also be an obvi­
ous error to see him  as a steady practitioner o f liberal ideals. His attach­
m ent to these was partial, irregular, frequently tactical and legitimising, 
and in the end dispensable in the nam e o f  order and sound governm ent. 
Policies were much affected by local circumstance. Bolivar’s inability to 
stabilise any o f  his new states and his own setting o f interventionist prec­
edents resulted in a consolidation o f  the military in the body politic and, 
thereby, an augm entation o f  fiscal pressures on the various national trea­
suries such as to make any abandonm ent o f  custom s-house income an 
impossibility.3 “The treasury is in a deplorable state,” he w rote o f Colom ­
bian finances in March 1829, “I do not know  where or how  to find the 
means with which to  maintain the army.”4 Foreign trade provided the 
answer. He decreed som e weeks later that since “the expenses o f  the 
Republic have increased with the necessity o f  m aintaining itself in a 
defensive attitude w ith respect to  Spain [...] and with that o f  arming itself 
to repel the aggression o f  Peru [...] it is absolutely essential to  secure the 
highest possible revenue from duties o f  im portation.”5 
Bolivar was no servant o f British commercial liberalism; neither was he 
any national econom ic liberator, vigorously pursuing som e patriotic 
objective o f strength through separation. The tariff could certainly be a 
distancer and a source o f  benefit to local industry and agriculture but it 
was there essentially to provide funds for ill nourished treasuries in mili­
tarized societies. The consolidation o f  econom ic independence, for what 
it was w orth, was in part the byproduct o f  much pettier consolidations o f 
local governm ental pow er and accompanying inconveniences to the 
European m erchant and investor.
II. CO N CEPTS
It is necessary, before proceeding w ith argum ent and docum entation, to 
give som e attention to the key concepts featuring in the discussion. 
Three term s in particular require attention: “in terim perium ”, “imperial­
2 Bolivar to Santander, Dec. 23, 1822, in Lecuna and Bierck (1951,1: 307); see also 
Belaúnde (1938: 263).
3 Johnson and Ladd (1968: 46,100); Halperin Donghi (1973:1-4,9-12,17-24); Lynch 
(1973: 343-344).
4 Bolivar to Castillo y Rada, Mar. 19, 1829, in Lecuna and Bierck (1951, II: 718).
5 Copy of tariff decree in PRO, B T 1/271, Campbell to Aberdeen,July 6 , 1829. See also 
Ospina Vásquez (1955: 103-104).
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ism ”, and “the tarifP. “Interim perium ” means a period “between imperial­
isms”, just as “interregnum ” — an ancient w ord o f identical construction 
and similar m eaning — refers to  a period “betweens reigns”. It has consid­
erable relevance to  Spanish America between independence and m id­
century, though w hether it is o f  any use for the study o f m odern po st­
colonial societies I am much less certain. N otionally it should be. Inde­
pendence m ovem ents d isrupt external relations, break the old imperial 
“peace”, and create a new and unstable body politic which generates vari­
ous forces o f repulsion helping to  keep fresh predators temporarily at 
bay. They may not succeed, however, in a tightly integrated world. In the 
late tw entieth century, imperial Moscow and W ashington, hypersensitive 
to  each o ther’s real and imagined am bitions, are ever active and com peti­
tively intrusive; ideology and intelligence activities exercise powerful 
covert influences; and disorder in the new states creates openings for 
sophisticated m etropolitan opportunism . The usefulness o f the term, 
therefore, is probably rather limited historically. The general question of 
imperial sequences, however, is one o f  perennial im portance. 
“Im perialism” also needs some com m ent. “Interim perium ” remains 
am biguous as long as “im perium ” is left undefined. 1 propose to avoid 
controversy very deliberately here by taking substantial account o f com ­
m on academic usage —m ore so than I have done in the past.6This is w hat 
logicians and others call relaxing on e’s assum ptions: a thoroughly 
respectable means o f diversifying a line o f  argum ent. Semantics can, 
within reason, be approached in dialectically functional terms. Failure to 
recognise this has thoroughly blighted studies o f imperialism, so much 
dissension com ing to  rest on often obscurely articulated definitional 
divergences. W hat I am looking for on one side o f the interim perium  is 
the crumbling m onolith  o f Spanish colonialism, som ething which needs 
no further com m ent here; and, on the o ther side, a decisively established, 
formative cluster o f trading and financial links w ith G reat Britain charac­
terised by a high degree o f  commercial liberalism and com m odity special­
isation. T he issue, essentially, is dom ination and a loss o f strategic initia­
tives to the foreigner.
Thirdly —and at som e le n g th —“the tarifP. We need an early sounding o f 
alarm bells to draw attention  to the labyrinthine difficulties o f  tariff 
evaluation, some o f  which are conveniently ignored in a lo t o f  historical 
analysis. It is, by J.R. McCulloch’s description, “a Table, alphabetically
6 See Mathew (1968: 562-563). In subsequent publications I have deliberately made 
very little use o f the term.
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arranged, specifying the various duties, drawbacks, bounties, etc. charged 
and allowed on the im portation and exportation o f articles o f foreign 
and dom estic produce” (McCulloch 1844: 1208). Tariff schedules are 
open to infinite diversification, with different and changing duties, spe­
cific and ad  valorem., on a potentially very wide range o f  exchanged com ­
modities. Its econom ic functions, in tended and concom itant, can also be 
num erous. M easurem ent o f impact, accordingly, is very complex. Five 
im portant aspects o f  the tariff can be looked at here: its degree, its 
accom panim ents, its political implications, its abstract convertibility 
from  “nom inal” to “effective” rates, and its objectives.
Since tariffs vary a great deal in level, duties may be so low that we have 
near-free trade, or so high that we have effective prohibition. H ow  much 
o f  the lower end o f  a tariff schedule deserves, practically if not concep­
tually, to be lum ped with free trade? O r in term s o f  our historical issues, 
how  many o f  the N orth  Andean im port duties seriously worried the Brit­
ish? Answers cannot easily be provided. For one thing, the scale o f local 
com petition differed between com m odities. Related to this were wider 
variations in price elasticities o f  dem and. W ith  high elasticity, a 5 per cent 
tariff could cause a notable decline in sales; w ith low, a 30 p ercen t tariff 
m ight have very little effect at all. The necessity for im port-trade disag­
gregation is, to say the least, m ethodologically awkward. There is, addi­
tionally, the subjective dim ension. If the British believed, w ithout resort 
to  careful analysis, that 15 per cent on cotton cloth was damaging to their 
interests and expressed themselves forcefully on the subject in Lima 
or Bogotá, then that in itself is a very basic datum . In 1872, after all, the 
House o f  C om m ons called for the repeal o f 3V2 to 5 per cent duties on 
cottons entering India on the grounds that they were “protective in their 
nature.”7
Secondly, accom panim ents to  the tariff. D uties were usually just one p o r­
tion o f  a whole body o f inter-related factors serving, deliberately or acci­
dentally, to im pede trade. There could, for example, be shipping and har­
bour dues; upcountry sales taxes; tariff discrimination against goods car­
ried in foreign ships; exchange-rate instability; dangers o f physical and 
financial assault; anti-foreign sentim ent; absence o f treaties; m arket-dis­
rupting political turbulence; persistence o f  protection and colonial pref­
erence in Britain herself, lim iting exchange; and high freight costs on 
ocean voyages and inland transport. These and other negative influences 
on com merce p u t the tariff in perspective and draw attention to the futil­
7 Resolution o f July 11, 1877, reproduced in D utt (i960, II: 299).
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ity o f  any analysis which attem pts to treat it in isolation. It m ust be firmly 
inserted in w hat one m ight term the com pound trade barrier.
Thirdly, the broad political implications o f the tariff. If, crudely, we iden­
tify it with econom ic independence and set it in opposition to  a loosely 
defined imperialism we do run the risk o f  seeing it as essentially progres­
sive-radical in political com plexion. D uties becom e so many stones in 
the sling, aimed at the giant. Assum ptions about progressivism, however, 
m ust be queried. Tariffs designed forpro tection  frequently confer advan­
tage on the politically influential producer at the expense o f  otherparties. 
“M ost argum ents for tariff protection ,” writes Samuelson, “are simply 
rationalizations for special benefits to particular pressure groups.”8 
Balassa has drawn attention to  the danger o f local m onopolies being 
encouraged in countries w ith small dom estic markets (Balassa et al. 1971: 
79). Tariffs, moreover, represent only the crudest sort o f economic plan­
ning, w orking in the main through price skewing in the free market 
(Myint 1971:171-172). They are, further, a set o f  indirect and highly regres­
sive taxes, being widely levied, historically, on articles o f mass consum p­
tion. As sources o f  state revenue they have also served to finance oppres­
sive, corrupt, and debt-ridden regimes.
Fourthly, the distinction between “nom inal” and “effective” protection — 
the main developm ent in tariff theory over the last tw enty years.9 It is 
recognised that the study o f  relations between im port duties and, say, the 
local production o f cotton cloth ought to take account o f m ore than just 
the duty on that cloth. D uties on im ports o f  inputs for cotton cloth p ro ­
duction (e.g. yarn) m ust also be included, inpu t-ou tpu t and value-added 
calculations made, and the rate o f  effective (as distinct from nominal) p ro ­
tection calculated. Further adjustm ents giving net effective protection  are 
made for whatever exchange-rate strengthening has occurred in conse­
quence o f the im position o f  the tariff (thereby reducing its effect). This 
can also be done for nominal duties. Differences can be very wide. 
According to  Balassa’s calculations, for example, processed foods in 
Chile enjoyed 82 per cent nominal, 2,884 per cent effective, and 1,676 per 
cent net effective protection in 1961 (Balassa et al, 1971: 54,56). This 
advanced conceptualization im poses considerable dem ands on the his­
torian and can make the exercise o f  necessary-data collection (price
8 Samuelson (1976: 703). See also Kindleberger ( 1968: 128) and Schumpeter (1951: 
102-104).
9 For example Balassa (1971: 3-9, 21-25, 49-69); Corden (1971: 1-2 ); Corden (1966: 
passim); H.G. Johnson (1971: 285-391).
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series, for instance) highly problematical. They also force an abandon­
m ent o f glib judgem ent in favour o f  frequent, honest agnosticism.10 
Finally, the objectives o f tariff policy. These can be num erous and, to 
varying degrees, contradictory. “N o t all [...] aspects o f  the tariff refer to 
the same analytical viewpoint,” warns K indleberger, “and it is o f  the 
u tm ost im portance to  distinguish carefully at w hat level o f interest the 
discussion runs” (K indleberger 1969: 105). A m ong the main reasons for 
duties on trade are: first, increased governm ent revenues (the prim e one 
historically);11 second, protection for local producers and their em ­
ployees or, m ore specifically, for infant industries (the prim e one theore t­
ically);12 third, (and an enlargem ent o f  the second), econom ic diversifica­
tion and a less vulnerable status in the international econom y; fourth, 
strengthening o f  the balance o f paym ents; fifth, an im provem ent in the 
term s o f  trade; sixth, an ability to  attract m ore foreign capital; seventh, 
assistance to econom ic activity o f strategic and military im portance; 
eighth, the acquisition o f  a bargaining counter for commercial negotia­
tions. The main contradiction here is that between the revenue goal and 
the protection goal. A good  revenue tariff requires a com m odity for 
which dem and has a low price elasticity at hom e (m eaning that people 
will continue to  buy and im port, largely regardless o f  inflated cost) and a 
low hom e elasticity o f supply (m eaning that local producers will not suc­
ceed in im port substitution). And w hat suits the governm ent in these 
respects suits the m etropolitan trader as well. A good protection tariff 
requires the opposite conditions: high elasticities o f  both  dem and and 
supply. It is the sort m ost likely to  offend the foreigner. Revenues need a 
continuing flow o f im ports; protection requires a significant degree o f 
blockage. “W hether or no t free trade is better than m oderate tariffs,” 
writes Richard Lipsey, “depends on the policy goals that one is trying to 
m aintain” (Lipsey 1966: 777). It is, claims G .D .H . Cole, “a question of 
expediency, to  be settled in accordance with the particular circumstances 
o f  each country” (Cole 1932: 426).
10 Economists themselves are to be heard bemoaning the absence of a sufficient 
“corpus o f respectable theoretical work that conceptualizes the issues raised by 
im port competition and enables the empirical analyst to examine the phenom e­
non of import competition insightfully” (Bhagwati 1982: l).
11 For a notable example, see Davis (1966: 306-308, 310, 316-317).
12 “The infant industry argument for protection,’’writes HarryJohnson,“is one o f the 
two exceptions allowed to the classical case for the beneficiality o f free trade (the 
other being the optim um  tariff argum ent)” (H.G. Johnson 1970: 59).
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III. H ISTO R IO G R A PH Y
W hat views do historians offer on the general issue o f  imperial succes­
sion?
Intellectually, the crudest characterisation is the one that presents the 
British as instant and trium phant imperialists in the 1820s; that talks of 
free trade and o f  great inundations o f  foreign manufactured goods; and 
that describes in a sentence or two the devastation o f Spanish American 
industry. W hat is o f special interest, however, is no t so much that we have 
som e diversity o f opinion (in quality as well as substance), but that seri­
ous scholarship does reveal a rather surprising degree o f unanimity. Many 
historians do accept, by implication, the notion  o f  an interim perium , 
though few o f them  give much attention to the tariff.
O ne certainly gains an im pression o f  com prehensive disagreem ent from 
the 1980 Platt and Stein and Stein papers in the Latin American Research 
Review, but it is a misleading one, resting in part, as A lbert suggests, in a 
differing “use o f w ords [...] dating, em phasis” (A lbert 1983:2 5). The only 
solid elem ent in the controversy is the contrast in views over w hat con­
stitutes national economic autonomy. For our purposes it is sufficient to 
record that Platt, in line with his earlier writings on the subject, views 
matters in thoroughly non-im perial term s, largely because o f  low 
volumes o f  trade (Spanish America being allegedly “over the edge o f  the 
periphery” -  Platt 1980: 115-119), and that Stein and Stein refute P latt’s 
charge that they have presented the transition from  colonial to p o st­
colonial as in any sense “sm ooth”, given the realities o f “a long destructive 
war for independence and its equally traumatic afterm ath” (Stein and 
Stein 1980: 133).
In their earlier book on the Colonial Heritage the Steins are sometim es 
rather imprecise on the succession, claiming that the English helped de­
stroy Iberian imperialism and “on its ruins [...] erected the inform al im pe­
rialism o f free trade and investm ent” (Stein and Stein 1970: 15 5). They do 
imply, however, that this was a long-term  rather than an instant achieve­
m ent since so much o f  the colonial heritage was a continuation o f  old 
Spanish restrictions o f m ind and institution. Early neocolonialism is vie­
wed not so much as intrusion by and collaboration with the British (in 
the m anner outlined by som e other dependentista w riters) but rather as the 
problem atical survival o f past “colonial patterns o f  production, capital 
accumulation and investm ent, income distribution and expenditure” 
which acted as “barriers” to  econom ic change. A “viable basis o f export 
econom ies” only em erged half a century or so after independence (Stein
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and Stein 1970:136). Platt’s and the Steins’factual perceptions o f the early 
national period are really rather similar.13
Platt’s view o f an introverted Latin America, m ost o f its states counting 
for little in the world econom y before the middle o f  the n ineteenth cen­
tury, is, in the broadest term s, shared by A ndré G under Frank. “D uring 
the period o f the m id-twenties to the mid-forties or fifties”, he writes in 
Capitalism and Underdevelopment, “the nationalist interests from the in te ­
rior were still able to  force their governm ents to im pose protective tariffs 
in many countries. Industry, national-flag shipping, and other develop­
m ent-generating activities show ed spurts o f life.” Only in mid-century 
did the free traders, “allied and subservient to  the foreign m etropolitan 
interests,” succeed in gaining control o f governm ents (Frank 1969a: 287, 
289). Eric Hobsbawm  observes in Industry and Empire that “British busi­
nessm en had great hopes o f  Latin America in the 1820s, when they hoped 
to create an inform al em pire there by the setting-up o f  independent 
republics. They were, at least initially, dispappointed” (Hobsbaw m  1969: 
131n.). In her British Commercial Policy and Trade Expansion, Judith  Blow 
Williams com m ents that “British commercial relations w ith the newly 
independent states o f Spanish America posed many problem s [...] M ost 
had unstable governm ents. O ften political parties made capital of anti- 
foreign feeling [...] The states m ight be plagued by fiscal difficulties 
which they would try to  m eet at the expense o f  the foreigner” (Williams 
1972 : 271-272).
Finally, in this abbreviated list,Tulio Halperin D onghi. In his Aftermath o f 
Revolution Halperin writes rather vaguely about extrem e liberation and 
floods o f im ports, but such observations are no t built into any claim that 
the continent was falling instant prey to a new imperialism (Halperin 
D onghi 1973: 46-47). Much tim e in fact is spent docum enting and analys­
ing post-independence militarization and the illiberalism that usually 
accompanied it. “The liberal hour,” he observes, “was to  strike in Latin 
America only in the middle o f the century” (Halperin D onghi 1973:1-43, 
140). The flood o f  im ports was no t sustained. A sharp and vital distinc­
tion is drawn between the destruction o f the old commercial systems 
and their financial com ponents, which Halperin claims did take place, 
and that o f  local industry which, he suggests, in substantial measure “held 
its ow n” (Halperin D onghi 1973: 46-52; 1969: 104-106). In Historia Con-
13 Stein and Stein (1980: 140) write that “it is not primarily the facts that are in 
dispute” and note “surprising agreement” between their work and Platt’s earlier 
findings.
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tem poránea he dates the beginnings o f  “the neocolonial o rder” from  the 
middle o f the century (Halperin D onghi 1969 : 207-208).
A m ong the various ideas present in the historical literature, one form ula­
tion — som etim es explicit, som etim es only loosely hinted at — seems par­
ticularly appropriate, and that is that the neocolonial features o f  the 
republics w ete,pace Stein and Stein, dom inantly Spanish rather than Brit­
ish; and, contra Bonilla and Spalding (1972: notably 55, 60), that the old 
colonial order, in its now highly disturbed and militarized state, instead of 
attracting the British in fact cramped and repelled them . The notion o f  a 
set o f export-oriented economies simply and easily shunting their 
m etropolitan links north from Spain to  Britain in the 1820’s is a non ­
sense. Leopoldo Zea gets to the heart o f the m atter when he writes that 
the independence wars “had been animated m ore by the Hispanic im pe­
rial spirit than by the spirit o f liberty [...] The struggle had not been be­
tween America and Spain, but between Spain and Spain. A younger 
Spain, but Spain after all, had conquered the old Spain “ (quoted  in Jo h n ­
son and Ladd 1968: 216-217). Bolivar, w ho m anifested much o f th a t im pe­
rial spirit himself, pronounced at A ngostura in 1819: “The relicts o f Span­
ish D om inion will continue a long tim e before we can com pletely de­
stroy them ” (Bolivar 1819: 12).
IV. N O R T H  A N D EA N  TARIFFS
T he specific issue o f the tariff is an im portant one in relation to questions 
o f  foreign intrusion. It is also a very difficult one to  handle. To some 
extent, as indicated earlier, we escape into subjectivity. If South American 
states, rightly or wrongly, identified a portion  o f their national wellbeing 
with tariffs and the British, ignoring their own protectionist and prefer­
ential practices back hom e,14 opposed them , then there was a quite real 
conflict. As Bolivar viewed it, “free com merce in our ports is the very 
foundation o f English national power.” Britain had no interest beyond 
“the prospects o f  a valuable com m erce” (Lecuna and Bierck 1951,1:71; II:
14 As late as 1844 an exporter from the Bolivarian states faced duties o f 4 l/5d a lb on 
cacao ( “oppressive,”according toJ.R.McCulloch), 3s alb  on tobacco (“agreat deal 
too high”), 63s per cwt on sugar (“prohibitory”) , 8 2/3 alb  on coffee,and up to 20s 
a quarter on wheat, rates for equivalent produce from British colonial areas being 
Id, 3s, zero, 4 i/3d, and up to 5s respectively (McCulloch 1844: 21, 290,296,1190, 
1209-1227).
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503). High tariffs m ight be taken as a threat to those prospects. Being the 
product o f governm ental enactm ent they, along with other regulations 
and treaties, became the prim e focus o f m etropolitan political economy 
in the continent. W hether or not they truly m erited much attention is a 
m atter that we shall investigate.
A ttention will be given to a num ber o f typical import tariffs from Gran 
Colombia and Peru, and then to  an atypical one, that o f Bolivia (and of 
the Peru-Bolivia Confederation o f  1836-39). Gran Colombia was a feder­
ation o f territories dating from 1821 and splitting in 1829-30 into the 
three separate states o f Colombia, Venezuela, and Ecuador. M ost tariffs o f 
the 1820s were variants o f  an 1817 Reconquista schedule.15 In 1823 m ost 
duties for goods im ported in foreign vessels were set within the range 15 
to  25 per cent. 17 Z2 per cent was levied on cottons, linens, woollens, and 
worsteads. A num ber o f agricultural products such as coffee, cacao, 
indigo, tobacco, and sugar were p rohib ited .16 Edward W atts in Cartagena 
found the restrictions “burdensom e”,17 while Jam es H enderson, the con­
sul general in Bogotá, w rote to Pedro Gual, the foreign secretary, o f his 
“zealous wishes to p rom ote the establishm ent o f  a liberal commercial 
code in Colombia,” exposing him  to long exercises in determ ined Sm ith­
ian logic.18 The tariff, he suggested, was not as reasonable as it seemed. 
For one thing, a high proportion  o f  British goods came in through the 
once-illicit channels from  Jamaica and were forced to pay an additional 5 
per cent, thus pushing the textiles rate up to 22 Z2.w Moreover, the 
m ethods o f  the colonial arancel had survived independence and were 
introducing false valuations and corruption into customs procedure. 
Officials ignored invoices and placed their own estimates on the value o f 
a cargo. H enderson claimed that 17 Z2 per cent could rise in effect to  30 to 
40 per cent.20 Traders were feeling “repugnance” at a system that required
15 PR O ,B T6/37, Henderson to Canning,Jan. 8,1824. See also OspinaVásquez (1955: 
96-97).
16 PRO, FO 18/37, W ood to Canning, Feb. 28 , 1826, in Humphreys (1940: 247-248); 
PRO, BT 6/40, Henderson to Canning, Oct. 9, 1824.
17 PRO, FO 18/6, Watts to Canning, May 9, 1824, in Humphreys (1940: 265).
18 PRO, BT 6/37, Henderson to Gual,June 25, 1824; PRO, FO 18/16, Henderson to 
Gual,Jan. 27, 1825.
19 PRO, BT 6/40, Henderson to Canning, Oct. 9,1824; see also PRO.BT 6/37,Tupper 
to Hamilton,Jan. 16,1824, and PRO, FO 18/6, Watts to Canning, May 9,1824, in 
Humphreys (1940: 256-258).
20 PRO, BT 6/37, Henderson to Canning,Jan. 8,1824, and Henderson to Gual,June 
25, 1824; see also OspinaVásquez (1955: 93-94).
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them  “to introduce certain goods under duties am ounting to a p roh ib i­
tion.”21
Little notice was taken o f the complaints. A tariff law o f  March 1826 raised 
the “average” from 25 to  28 per cent,22 and a decree o f  Bolivar’s in 1828 
gave rates for over 1,000 item s.23 A further law, o f 1829 (“the personal 
w ork o f the Liberator” -  O spina Vásquez 1955: 98) g o t rid o f the discrim­
ination against British colonial im ports but took  im m ediate com pensa­
tion by applying the old Jamaican rate to the directly im ported textiles. 
The range for goods brought in in foreign vessels extended from 18 to 
33/2 per cent. There were also many specific duties and one or two p roh i­
bitions (including sugar cane).21 Patrick Campbell, the British chargé d ’af­
faires in Bogotá, considered the new rates to  be a notable increase overall 
but did not, oddly, think him self “authorized to make any representation 
or rem onstrance.”25 Shortly after, another decree was issued banning 
im ports o f certain cloths into Guayaquil and other Pacific po rts.26 Tariffs 
in lesser Colombia after the secessions continued at these quite high 
levels until the middle o f  the century.27
There is no question that these newly issued duties were im posed in 
considerable measure for revenue reasons though the custom s houses 
usually came second to the tobacco m onopoly as a source o f funds 
(M cGreevey 1971: 40). Bolivar’s insistence on the need to  finance the 
army from  trade in 1829 has already been cited.28 It seems that the tariffs 
were generally successful as revenue raisers since the price elasticity of 
both  supply and dem and for the com m onest im ports, namely textiles, 
was low. This suited bo th  the governm ent and the British. Edward W atts 
com m ented that as “coarse m anufactured goods” were o f  “indispensable 
necessity to the mass o f the population o f  this country, the increased
21 PRO ,BT6/37,Henderson to G ualjune  25,1824. See also critical remarks on “heavy 
duties” and depressed trade in Ducoudray Holstein (1830, 1: 29, 267, 269). These 
conflict with Ospina Vásquez’s and Huck’s references to “free trade” in the 1820s: 
Ospina Vásquez (1955: xii, 100; Huck 1972: 18-19).
22 PRO, BT 6/54, Watts to Bidwell, April 23, 1828.
23 PRO, BT 6/54, Henderson to Dudley, Apr. 13, 1828.
24 PRO, BT 1/271, Campbell to Aberdeen, July 6 , 1829.
25 Ibid.
26 PRO, BT 1/271, Decree of Aug. 1, 1829; PRO, BT 1/265, Campbell to Aberdeen, 
Sept. 29, 1829.
27 PRO, BT 1/288,Turner to Palmerston, Apr. 14,1832; Huck (1972:18,25-29); Ospina 
Vásquez (1955: xii, 147).
28 See also Ducoudray Holstein (1830,1: 11, 28, 30); Huck (1972: 21); Lynch (1973: 
343-344); McGreevey (1971: 78); Ospma Vásquez (1955: lOO); PRO, BT 1/250, 
Watts to Bidwell, Mar. 17, 1828.
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duties on them  are no t considered as prejudicial to  their im portation [...] 
and that consequently those heavy duties will fall wholly on the consum ­
ers o f  those manufactures.”29 Four years later, when duties on textile 
im ports into the rum p o f Colombia w ent up to  30 per cent, the British 
chargé in Bogotá declared it did “no t in itself involve a hardship suffi­
ciently considerable to justify any strong complaints on the part o f our 
com merce.”
He also pointed ou t that the “alleged m otives” for the increase had been 
“the necessities o f the State, & the determ ination o f  this G ovt, to enforce 
the Principle [...] o f encouraging dom estic manufacturers.”50 Both objec­
tives, for reasons given earlier, could not have been secured sim ulta­
neously and comprehensively. The textile duties, as suggested, were not 
w orking very protectively, although the defensive objective was always 
around (O spina Vasquez 1955: 121-122). The early prohibition on 
im ports o f  coffee, cacao, sugar, and other com m odities produced in Gran 
Colom bia ruled out revenue-raising and, smugglers perm itting, m ust 
have been o f  som e assistance to  landowners and o ther agricultural 
groups. In the late 1820s, repeated petitions from  the celebrated m anu­
facturing province o f Q uito for a prohibition o f certain cotton and w ool­
len im ports, “the introduction o f  which has been found prejudicial to  the 
Industry o f  the Country, and to  the consum ption o f  its manufactures, 
which was formerly the source o f  wealth to that D epartm ent,” was the 
reason for Bolivar’s decision to close the Pacific ports to a variety o f com ­
peting  textiles in 1829.51 Huck identifies strong protectionist sentim ent 
under Santander in the 1830s (Huck 1972: 17, 25-29). At the end o f  our 
period the duty on so-called domésticas was, according to  O spina Vasquez, 
as high as 51 per cent (McGreevey 1971: 80).
N on-prohibitory regulations are difficult to assess w ithout contrasting 
sets o f  price indices. Protection, too, has to  be m easured by the nominal 
rate since the data on im port coefficients and on value added in m anu­
facture are not available for calculations o f effective duties. N o adjust­
m ents either can be made with any pretence o f accuracy for exchange-rate 
changes consequent upon any reduction in im ports. These points have 
to  be stressed lest the im pression be gained, here and below, that our 
remarks offer anything m ore than the sketchiest outline o f  the possible 
implications o f  the tariff. Luckily, revenue and protection represent
29 PRO, BT 6/54, Watts to Bidwell, Apr. 23, 1828.
30 PRO, BT 1/288, Turner to Pereira, Mar. 20, 1832.
31 Decree o f Aug. 1,1829 in PRO, BT 1/271; see also Ospina Vasquez (1955:101,123).
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som ething close to  the sum o f the objectives. Tariffs were m odestly con­
ceived, and an im portant notional objective like im proving the term s of 
trade could be ignored since none o f these countries had the sort o f pu r­
chasing pow er likely to influence British prices back hom e. T he pro tec­
tive impulse, too, derived no t so much from any diversification or infant- 
industry plans but from simple political concerns — trying to  hum our the 
large landowners and head off trouble from  the artisans in Q uito. 
Venezuela became a separate state in 1830 and seems to have inherited 
m ost o f the old Colombian tariff, its broad features persisting up until 
the start o f the “Yellows” and “Blues” struggles o f the late 1840s (Williams 
1972 : 280-281). The Venezuelans attem pted, unsuccessfully, to  bargain 
with the British in 1844 for a reciprocal reduction o f im port duties, offer­
ing lower rates on ironware in return for the same on sugar and on cof­
fee.32 By the end o f  the decade duties were rising, reaching an average of 
37 per cent in 1847-48 and 41 per cent in 1848-49. O n top o f  that, “extraor­
dinary contributions” o f  10 and 15 per cent were required after June 
1849.33 The governm ent w ould listen to  no appeals for m oderation, com ­
plained Belford W ilson. He noted  the usual com bination o f  revenue and 
protection motives. “The heavy expenses [...] incurred in the suppression 
o f General Páez’s two Rebellions in 1848 and 1849, serve as a plausible 
popular topic on which to  descant as an argum ent in favour o f the contin­
uance o f Heavy D uties on Trade and for a necessity o f protecting Native 
Industry.” There was “a strong and increasing [...] clamour” for the latter 
objectives.34 It may well have been widely secured. Low elasticity o f 
dem and for textiles and other British goods had helped keep up reve­
nues in the past and lim ited the range o f protection ( “our manufactures 
[...],” in the w ords o f  a British consul in 1830, being “in com m on use 
am ong all classes” and “am ong the objects o f necessity”),35 but w ith high 
duties com bining at the end o f the 1840s with political turm oil the scene 
altered quite drastically. Im ports fell from a peak o f  .£1,183,988 in 1841 to 
,£437,116 in 1848-49. The British figure dropped from .£196,217 in 1847-48 
to  a pitiful £97,476 in 1848-49.36 O ne way or another “Native Industry” 
was getting  m ore o f  the hom e market. The balance o f tariff-effect p ro b ­
ably tipped decisively away from  revenue towards protection.
32 PRO, FO 80/29- Fortique to Aberdeen,Jan. 8, Apr. 9 ,May 29, Oct. 15,1844; Aber­
deen to Fortique, Feb. 26 , Oct. 12, 1844.
33 PRO ,FO 80/76, W ilson’s “General Review o f the Trade o f Venezuela in 1848-1849.”
34 PRO, FO 80 //6, W ilson’s “General Review of the Trade ....”
35 PRO, BT 1/297, Wall to Bidwell, Aug. 13, 1830.
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In Peru, m oderate-to-high tariffs persisted from independence till the 
1850s, w ith one notable relaxation in the short period o f thePeru-Bolivia 
Confederation 1836-39 (which will be looked at with Bolivia). In 1822 
the duty on textiles and hardware goods, if im ported by foreigners, was 
set at 25 per cent and in 1825 this was raised to 35 per cent. In 1826 it came 
down to 30 per cent, but was set alongside 80 per cent levies on a variety 
o f rough cottons and woollens (tocuyos and bayetones), ready-made 
clothes, hats, boots and shoes, furniture, sugar, tobacco, hides, and spirits. 
All duties were subject to arancel irregularities.37 In the years that fol­
lowed a num ber o f  the strongly protected items m oved from high duties 
to prohibition and back.38 A degree o f  liberalisation occurred in 1833 but 
its im portance should not be exaggerated. M ost rough textiles remained 
on the prohibited list and boots and shoes and a num ber o f cloths came 
dow n from 90 to 45-50 per cent. W heat and flour rose to  93 and 67 per 
cent respectively. European-style woollens and cottons were to be 
allowed in at 25-45.39 T he 25 p ercen t rate dropped further to 20 in 1835, 
but only if cargoes had come directly to Peru. If they were warehoused en 
route in any non-Peruvian Pacific p o rt the duty was to be 33 p ercen t —an 
inconvenience to traders w ho m ade use o f  Valparaiso, “the D eposit Mar­
ket o f the Pacifick.”40
It is also misleading to  refer to  decisive liberality in the tariff o f 1840.41 In 
the charged atm osphere following the dem ise o f  the Peru-Bolivia C on­
federation Gam arra was prepared to concede reductions on wheat and 
flour for the benefit o f  his Chilean allies, but the rate for cottons, linens, 
and woollens (except prohibited  bayetones) was set at 25 percen t and low 
Confederation duties o f  5 per cent on a num ber o f items were pushed up 
to levels ranging from  6 to  40 per cent.42 (It was also in 1840 that the 
Peruvian governm ent set about constructing the m onopolistic system of 
guano exporting.) The trend became markedly upward again after 1848.
36 PRO, FO 80/76, W ilson’s “General Review of the Trade ... .”
37 PRO, FO 61/8 , Ricketts to Canning, Dec. 27,1826, in Humphreys (1940: 144, 146- 
191, 198-206).
38 Gamarra decree, Feb. 20,1832, in PRO, BT 1/288, Kelly and W illimot to Bidwell, 
Apr. 21, 1832.
39 PRO, BT 1/303, W ilson to Palmerston, Dec. 18,1833; Manuel del Rio to Wilson, 
Dec. 18, 1833; H unt (1985: 308).
40 PRO, BT 1/312, Wilson to Palmerston, Feb. 14, 1835.
41 See Gootenberg (1982: 331, also 335) — where it is referred to as “liberal legisla­
tion.”
42 PRO, FO 61/82 , W ilson to Palmerston, Apr. 15, 1841; Hunt (1985: 308).
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Local textile factories were granted 40 per cent protection and duty-free 
im ports. In D ecem ber 1849 it was decreed that the executive could place 
a 90 per cent duty on any manufactured articles it chose. 1 per cent was 
added to all im port taxes and in the same year the tocuyo duty was advan­
ced from 25 to 40 per cent.'13 The emphasis on textile duties was likely to 
inconvenience the British.
In the country which Belford W ilson described in 1842 as “the w orst 
governed [...] in all Spanish America,”4" the revenue elem ent was central 
to  tariff policy. Peru, for C.M. Ricketts in 1826, was an exaggerated 
example o f the principie that in “all new governm ents the means o f rais­
ing a revenue by levying high duties is generally recurred to.”45 Military 
conflict im posed severe burdens on the treasury. It was estim ated in the 
early 1840s that the army, directly or indirectly, drew possibly as many as 
30,000 men away from productive activity.46 Some o f the costs were m et 
by the old Indian poll tax, but the larger proportion  o f  revenues — 5 3 per 
cent in bo th  1825 and 1840 —came from custom s dues (M cQueen 1926: 
37). C om m enting on high transit duties on goods bound for Bolivia, W il­
son declared in 1835 that the object was “to raise a p resent Revenue at all 
hazards.”47 T he w ords touch on a central reality o f so much o f  early nine­
teenth  century financial history in the N orth  Andean states. The p rohibi­
tions and very high duties were, o f course, useless to  the treasury. Rates 
up to  the 20-30 per cent band, however, do seem to have allowed trade to 
expand and, therefore, revenues to  increase. Over the period 1827 to 1840 
the declared value o f British exports to  Peru rose from .£228,000 to 
¿6800,000. The sta te’s income from the custom s houses doubled over 
roughly the same period.48
Low price elasticity o f dem and again appears to  have affected much of 
the British im port trade. Local com petition, in Ricketts’view in 1826, was 
inconsequential. Im ported  clothes, shoes, hats, and other item s o f  com ­
m on use rem ained widely saleable in spite o f the 30 per cent tariff. The 
main problem s for British merchants arose no t so much from duties, as
43 PRO, FO 61/118, Adams to Palmerston,June 12,1848; PRO, FO 61/126, Adams to 
Palmerston, Dec. 24, 1849; Gootenberg (1982: 344).
44 PRO, FO 97/284, Wilson to Canning, Aug. 27, 1842.
45 PRO, FO 61/8 , Ricketts to Canning, Dec. 27,1826, in Humphreys (1940: 144, also 
198).
46 PRO, FO 97/284, Wilson to Canning, Aug. 27, 1842.
47 PRO, BT 1/312, W ilson to Palmerston, Feb. 14, 1835.
48 McQueen (1926: 37); Parliamentary Papers (1854-55, LII: 503); Porter (1851: 362- 
365) .The export figures should, ideally, be adjusted positively for goods entering 
from Valparaiso and, negatively, for items bound for Bolivia by way of Arica.
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from  com peting N orth  Americans and Europeans. A m ong the British 
articles he cited as finding special favour with large num bers o f  Peruvians 
were M anchester calicoes, Rochdale baizes and coatings, muslin dresses, 
and lappets. The only items specified as suffering from “high duties” were 
a few shoes from Scotland.49
T he objective o f  protection was also pursued, but probably with only 
patchy results. The 1826 commercial code declared that trade “should be 
anim ated by protecting and favouring laws” (H um phreys 1940:198). All 
the im ports labouring under 80 per cent duties were described as being 
“prejudicial to the agriculture and industry o f the S tate” (H um phreys 
1940: 20l) — thus sugar; thus tocuyos, bayetas, and bayetones. Prohibitions 
and effective prohibitions, prevailing into the mid-1830s, m ust have 
helped the local producer and were probably enacted with political 
considerations in mind. In the turm oil o f the early-national period 
governm ents were loath to  see disaffection spread am ong locally pow er­
ful interest groups. In Decem ber 1833, President Gamarra, according to 
Belford W ilson, “erased from the new Code the perm ission conceded in 
it to  im port coarse cottons, Tocuyos, coarse w oollen cloths.This measure 
he adopted, as he unhesitatingly avowed to  me, for the purpose o f  keep­
ing alive his Party in the Interior, where these articles are wove, though of 
a very ordinary and expensive M anufacture.”50 The often m oderate duties 
on other items, however, m ust have com bined with low dem and elastic­
ity for textiles and o thergoods o f  com m on consum ption to keep protec­
tion down to rather ineffectual levels. T he rise in rates in the late 1840s 
shows that the very substantial and forceful protectionist lobby, as ana­
lysed by G ootenberg  (1982: 338-350), believed that the preceding duties 
had been too low. O n the o ther hand, the very presence o f a group who 
could secure the Ley de Artesanos proves that large num bers o f manufac­
turing establishm ents in Lima had survived the pressure from foreign 
im ports. T he regulations to  help the new textile factories were very spe­
cifically o f  the infant-industry sort (G ootenberg  1982: 344) and high­
light, through contrast, the defensive character o f  m ost protective duties 
in Peru and elsewhere, propping  up no t so much the young but the old 
and disabled.
Finally, Bolivia: “a case,” according to Williams, “where close co-opera­
tion between G reat Britain and a new nation w orked for the benefit o f
49 PRO, FO 61/8 , Ricketts to Canning, Dec. 27. 1826, in Humphreys (1940: 122-123, 
140-141, 195-198).
50 PRO, BT 1/303, Wilson to Palmerston, Dec. 18, 1833.
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both  countries” (W illiams 1972: 283). She was certainly exceptional, 
adopting for well over half o f  the period regulations o f unusual liberality. 
Overall rates o f 8 and 5 per cent are cited for 1826 and 1831 respectively by 
British agents.51 D uring the Confederation with Peru the latter’s 90 per 
cent on tocuyos was brought down to 20 per cent and the same rate placed 
on m ost other goods as well, with a 30 per cent maximum being set in 
1837.52 A lthough this was an increase in strictly Bolivian tariffs it remained 
m odest enough to  please the British foreign secretary Lord Palmerston, 
who forecast fine developm ental prospects for the confederated territo ­
ries as a result o f their “liberal system o f  Commercial Policy.”5’
The dom inant political force in early national Bolivia was Andrés de 
Santa C ruz: a man with “a very strong bias in favour o f England,” accord­
ing toJ.B . Pentland.54 His liberalism, however, was not o f the uncorrupt­
ed Chuquisaca variety, and it w ould be difficult to explain Bolivia’s pecu­
liarity w ith reference to  his personal economic convictions. It cannot be 
claimed either that Bolivia was free from militarism and related expenses. 
In 1831 the army com prised nearly 12,000 regular and irregular troops, 
some tim e later m opping up well over half o f available fiscal resources.’5 
There was no uncom m only large, non-custom s source o f revenue avail­
able to the governm ent, the main source o f  funds in the early 1830s being 
a 5 Z2 per cent alcabala sales tax.56 The political expediency o f selective 
protection, moreover, m ust have been as obvious in Bolivia as it was in 
neighbouring countries, though perhaps less was needed given high 
transport costs from  the Pacific to the main centres o f population. It is in 
fact to  geography that we m ust look for an explanation o f the country’s 
odd attachm ent to  commercial liberalism — an attachm ent which, signifi­
cantly, weakened a little when Bolivia joined Peru in 1836-39 and 
regained her old approaches to the sea. Before 1836 the main effort was 
to pull trade away from the traditional U pper Peru po rt o f  Arica in order 
to  escape Peruvian transit duties and to  build up a prestigious com petitor 
po rt by the Pacific. The deserted village o f Cobija was selected in the mid-
51 PRO, FO 61/7, Ricketts to Canning,May 30,1826, in Humphreys (1940: 218); PRO, 
FO 61/20, Pen tland’s “Review of the Rise, Progress and Actual State o f the Republic 
o f Bolivia,” Oct. 24. 1831.
52 PRO, FO 6/53, Wilson to Palmerston, Mar. 20 , 1834.
53 PRO, FO 61/43, Palmerston to Wilson, Oct. 30, 1837.
54 PRO, FO 61/20, Pentland’s “Review ...,” Oct. 24, 1831.
55 Ibid.; PRO, BT 1/297, W ilson to Palmerston, Mar. 27, 1833.
56 PRO, BT 1/297, Wilson to Palmerston, Mar. 5, 1833; see also PRO, FO 61/20, Pent­
land’s “Review ...,” Oct. 24, 1831.
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1820s and specially low duties were set to  attract m erchants.”  In the late 
1820s Santa Cruz showed how  his perspectives were national rather than 
liberal by im posing a 30 per cent duty (and contem plating 50) on all 
goods entering Bolivia from Peru. Many British traders still used the 
Arica route.58 Between 1828 and 1832 Cobija’s im ports grew  from  $80,117 
to $852 ,032/’ By 1831 it was reckoned that tw o-thirds o f  foreign goods 
came in that way, w ith increasing num bers o f  trading houses transferring 
south from Arica.60 Surprisingly, though, o f the 399 ships entering in 
1827-33 as few as 40 were British (and 16 o f  these naval vessels). French 
and U nited States ships were the m ost conspicuous.61 
Bolivian tariffs m ust be characterised as fiscal rather than protective, 
though even as fund raisers they could hardly have been very effective. 
Britain appears to  have given som e push to  liberalising tendencies. J.B. 
Pentland claimed to have been instrum ental in getting  the Cobija policy 
under way, and Santa Cruz’s tariff for the Confederation was based 
largely on a code w orked ou t by a specially appointed com m ittee o f Brit­
ish and other m erchants.62
In Bolivia, many elem ents o f the com pound trade barrier discussed earli­
er came into play. Cobija, for example, lay at the end o f  the Atacama des­
ert 400 miles from the capital Sucre (Chuquisaca) and connected with 
the interior by only prim itive road transport. Political turm oil too — as in 
much o f Spanish America — had clear, adverse implications for trade. A 
Foreign Office m em orandum  o f 1841 referred to  “the m agnitude o f the 
evil which this state o f things entails upon the commercial interests o f 
G. Britain.”6’ High transport costs and unstable governm ents, however, 
are familiar enough problem s historiographically and can be pu t to  one 
side here. Two other m atters, though, do seem w orthy o f som e abbreviat­
ed com m ent, bo th  o f  them  consequences o f deliberate policy in areas 
adjacent to the tariff—additional charges on trade, and treaties with the 
U nited K ingdom .
57 PRO, FO 61/20 , Pentland’s “Review . . . Oct. 24, 1831; PRO, BT 1/297, Wilson to 
Palmerston, Mar. 27. 1833; PRO, BT 1/297, Pentland to Palmerston, Dec. 8, 1833.
58 PRO, BT 1/297, Passmore to Bidwell, Feb. 24, 1830.
59 PRO, BT 1/297, Pentland to Palmerston, Dec. 8 , 1833.
60 PRO, FO 61/20 , Pentland’s “Review . . . Oct. 24, 1831.
61 PRO, BT 1/297, Wilson to Palmerston, Mar. 27, 1833.
62 PRO, FO 61/20 , Pentland’s “Review ... ,” Oct. 24,1831; PRO, FO 61/53, Wilson to 
Palmerston, Sept. 29, 1838.
63 PRO, FO 97/284, “Memorandum o f Spanish American States,” Dec. 31, 1841.
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In Gran Colombia between 1822 and 1825 foreigners could no t receive 
cargoes in local ports but had to do all their business through indigenous 
merchants. The latter were viewed as inefficient and corrupt and had to 
be paid substantial agency fees. The rule was rem oved at the request of 
the British consul general in Bogotá, Jam es H enderson.64 Tonnage and 
harbour dues were also considered to be “exceedingly onerous.” A law of 
July 1824 set, for foreign ships, the tonnage rate at 4 reales and anchorage 
at $12 per vessel. Pilotage in and out o f harbour could be as high as $150.65 
These three charges would am ount to  $262 on a 200-ton vessel. Transit 
duties were a further burden in years w hen goods were m oved around 
from one po rt to another in search o f a m arket.66 It was, moreover, the 
habit to add 3 per cent to  im port duties as a levy on notional return car­
goes o f bullion and specie.67 Colombia also allowed old taxes, such as the 
avería, the alcabala, and the San Lazaro to  survive independence.68 In 
1824 these were consolidated into a single 3 per cent derecho de consumo 
(O spina Vásquez 1955: 94-95; Williams 1972 : 277), but the alcabala was 
periodically revived in the years ahead (Huck 1972: 23; O spina Vásquez 
1955: 95, 143).
In Peru, likewise, the tonnage duty was 4 reales in the mid-1820s. Since it 
was collected at every landfall in Peru, vessels on the slow, speculative trip 
north from Valparaiso could have quite sizeable bills to  m eet. A 6 per cent 
supplem ent was also levied on im port duties for each extra port o f  call. 
“M erchants complain very justly o f  this excess,” reported C.M. Ricketts.69 
Traders also objected to the alcabala sales tax, initially 2, then 4, then a 
“vexatious and oppressive” 6 per cent. W hen  this was go t rid o f in 1826, 
the benefit was largely cancelled out by the prohibition o f  foreigners 
from any trading in the interior70—a ruling repeated by Gam arra in 1840.71 
Internal duties survived into the 1830s and with them  the consulado 
im post o f 1 per cent and the ways-and-means levy o f 5 per cent, bo th  of
64 PRO, BT 6/37, Henderson to Canning,Jan. 8, 1824; McFarlane and other British 
merchants to Watts, Feb. 16,1824; Henderson to Canning,June 29,1824; Watts to 
Planta, Aug. 9, 1824.
65 PRO, BT 6/37, Henderson to Canning,Jan. 8,1824; PRO, FO 18/37, W ood to Can­
ning, Feb. 28, 1826, in Humphreys (1940: 250).
66 PRO, FO 18/37, W ood to Canning, Feb. 28 ,1826, in Humphreys (1940: 244-255).
67 PRO, BT 6/37, McFarlane and other British merchants to Watts, Feb. 16, 1824.
68 PRO, BT 6/37, Henderson to Canning, Jan. 8 , 1824.
69 PRO, FO 61/8 , Ricketts to Canning, Dec. 27, 1826, in Humphreys (1940: 149).
70 Ibid., in Humphreys (1940: 155, 204).
71 PRO, FO 61/70, Wilson to Palmerston, Dec. 31, 1840.
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them  falling on foreign goods.72 Peru, despite concern about keeping 
Bolivian trade running through Arica, was levying duties o f  5 to  15 per 
cent on goods m oving upcountry from the p o rt in 1839-73 
These items are selected exclusively from  Colom bia and Peru and no 
analysis accompanies them . They make it clear that trade taxes were not 
exclusively the w ork o f custom s house officials. A notional 25 per cent 
im port duty when com bined w ith internal taxes and transit expenses 
could easily be doubled a few score miles into the interior. As M cGreevey 
(1971: 80) observes o f  Colombia, “local duties, state taxes and transport 
costs were probably greater in value than the tariffs; the tariff itself p ro ­
vided only part o f the protection for dom estic producers”. 
Commercial treaties were not essential for the effective conduct o f  trade 
between nations, but they attended loosely to  “the security o f  merchants 
and navigation, and the facility o f  commercial transactions” (McCulloch 
1844: 1260), and as such could be a source o f  reassurance and a standard 
for behaviour. The British set considerable store by them , right from the 
earliest days o f  independence. Colom bia was the first o f  the Bolivarian 
states to oblige, in 1825, the arrangem ent lasting until 1850 and beyond 
(Williams 1972: 278-279). Venezuela and Ecuador signed separate treaties 
in 1834 and 1839 respectively (Williams 1972: 280-282). Peru-Bolivia 
negotiated term s in 1837, but after the collapse o f the Confederation Peru 
let her part o f  the com m itm ent lapse, renewing it only in 1850 (Williams 
1972: 283-288). Averaging it all ou t we find that Britain spent m ost o f her 
tim e in the N orth  Andean states unsupported  by treaties. Such arrange­
m ents were frequently very unpopular in the region. “The actual Treaty,” 
reported Daniel O ’Leary, the British chargé in Bogotá in 1844, “is consid­
ered [...] in every way prejudicial to  the Interests o f  the Country, and great 
is the anxiety on the part o f the G overnm ent to  have it annulled.”74 W al­
ter Cope observed in Q uito in 1839 that prevailing opinion was “m ani­
festly against Treaties with the European N ations,” holding that there 
could be no reciprocity “between powerful nations .and weak ones.” 
South Americans, unlike Europeans, “could not take advantage o f the 
concessions in their favour on account o f the confined state o f  their com ­
mercial operations.”75 Treaties o f  unlim ited duration would be a form  o f
72 Decree ofjan. 31,1835, in PRO, B T 1/312,Wilson to Palmerston, Feb. 14,1835; W il­
liams (1972 : 286).
73 PRO, BT 1/355, Wilson to Palmerston,July 29, 1839.
74 PRO, FO 55/48, O ’Leary to Aberdeen, Sept. 1, 1844.
75 PRO, BT 2/5, Cope to Bidwell, Aug. 22, 1839- For evidence o f similar opinions in 
Chile, see PRO, FO 16/41, Walpole to Palmerston, Oct. 3, 1840.
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“perpetual thraldom .” Even in Bolivia the renewed arrangem ent o f  1840 
was the subject o f “a long and agitated debate” in Sucre, according to  W il­
son w ho w ent there to sign it: “all N egotiations with European Powers 
are viewed [...] w ith a degree o f distrust and suspicion greater even than 
is com m on to the o ther Spanish American Republics.”76
V. C O N C LU SIO N S
If trade was the essence o f  any British imperialist th rust in early nine­
teenth  century South America (profitable investm ent being inconse­
quential) then we cannot easily view the N orth  Andean states as im por­
tant victims. They were no t made to  do anything against their com m er­
cial will by the British governm ent nor were they notably pressurised by 
the anonym ous forces o f  m etropolitan capitalism. Table 1 shows their 
insignificance as markets for British goods at the end o f our thirty-year 
period. Bolivar’s “colossus that extends to every corner o f the earth”77 
had secured no m ore than a toehold in his republics.
Table 1
Destination o f British Exports 1846-1849: Annual Average Declared Value in £
Latin American Countries Value % of Total 
o f Latin 
America
% o f Total
U.K.
Exports
Value
per
Head
Mexico & Central America 619,483 9.1 1.1 0.06
Cuba and Puerto Rico 883,818 13.0 1.5 0.54
Colombia, Venezuela & Ecuador 407,467 5.9 0.7 0.09
Peru & Bolivia 794,899 U .6 1.4 0.24
Brazil 2,457,540 36.2 4.2 0.34
Argentina & Uruguay 
[with Paraguay] 670,878 9.9 1.2 0.54
Chile 970,716 14.3 1.7 0.75
Total United Kingdom Exports 58,268,681 - - -
Sources'. Figures based on Porter (1851: 362-367) and Sánchez-Albornoz 
(1974: table 5.11).
N otable changes, however, occurred after mid-century. These — signal­
ling the gradual and irregular dem ise o f  the interim perium  — cannot be 
examined here. They require much additional argum ent and docum en-
76 Bolivar to Hyslop, May 19, 1815, in Lecuna and Bierck (1951,1: 98).
77 PRO, FO 61/70, Wilson to Palmerston, Nov. 9, 1840.
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tation and careful analysis o f the interplay between tariffs and other ele­
m ents o f the com pound trade barrier. Peru manifests an interesting com ­
bination o f  export boom  and m odest tariff liberalisation. Colombia lacks 
dramatic commercial expansion, but does show  widespread reductions 
in duties. It will suffice here to refer the reader to the w ork o f G ooten- 
berg, H unt, and M cQueen; and Bushnell, McGreevey, O spina Vásquez, 
Palacios, and Safford.78
A num ber o f  distinction-drawing points m ust be made in conclusion. 
First, tariffs, while o f  the greatest interest fiscally and politically, do, in 
relation to trade, have to be considered alongside o ther obstacles to  com ­
m odity exchange. The analytical exercise should, in substantial measure, 
be one o f determ ining their comparative weight within the com pound 
trade barrier.
Second, this w eight was low er in the interior than in the ports and draws 
attention to  an im portant distinction that has to  be made between heart­
land and periphery. Degrees o f  protection and o f  com petition, and o f in ­
stitutional, financial, and political intrusion, could vary significantly be­
tween ports such as Cartagena and Guayaquil and inland manufacturing 
centres like Boyacá and Q uito. The historian has to look carefully at the 
geographical referents o f source material specifying the impact o f  foreign 
trade on local enterprise.
Third, a distinction m ust also be drawn between the reaction o f old arti­
san industries to  trade and that o f  new or intended “infant” industries, 
and careful attention given to  their differing developm ental implications. 
Protection in the N orth  Andes before 18 5 0 was usually o f  the “senile” sort 
(O spina Vasquez 1955: 140-I4l).
Fourth, in on e’s som etim es obsessive focus on relations w ith the 
m etropolis, one m ust not forget that there was quite a lo t o f trade within 
the continent itself and that protection  was by no means a gesture made 
exclusively in the direction ofindustry : agriculture and m ining,as Ospina 
Vásquez points out, were som etim es considered to  be m ore w orthy of 
tariff assistance (O spina Vásquez 1955: 122).
Fifth, measure m ust always be taken o f  the differing objectives o f  im port 
duties. In the Bolivarian republics protection and revenue were far and
78 Gootenberg (1982: 351-358); H unt (1985: 295,306-308); McQueen (1926: 5-10,37- 
38); Bushnell (1956: 3-6); McGreevey (1971: 78-82, 97-106, 169-171); Ospina Vás­
quez (1955:195-232); Palacios (1980: 2-20); Safford (1965:187-364). See also Platt 
(1972:78-81).
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away the principal ones, w ith revenue the m ore im portant o f the two and 
directed in the main towards the military. The collection o f urgently 
needed funds in a handful o f  customs houses saved on scarce bureaucrat­
ic resources and avoided the em barrassm ents o f  direct taxation. Strong 
local pressures gave rise to  protection, but they were less regular and 
rarely progressive.79 Prohibitions were the surest approach and widely 
resorted to, bu t they o f course cancelled ou t any custom s-house gain. 
O ther possible tariff objectives, such as those listed in section tw o, were 
usually absent. The contradictory goals indentified, however, draw atten­
tion to the awkward ambivalence o f so much tariff policy.
Sixth, there is the central distinction between high and low elasticities of 
dem and and supply for different com modities. O ne has to  disaggregate 
the im ports before analysis can proceed, and that has been kept simple 
here by looking only at the main category, namely textiles. H igh elastici­
ties indicate a good protection tariff and low elasticities a good  revenue 
tariff. The evidence available suggests fairly low elasticity on cottons, lin­
ens, and woollens. N o t only did this suit local treasuries, it also suited the 
British. That, alm ost certainly, was one reason why their complaints 
about tariffs were rather m uted. Such low elasticity is com m on to p ro d ­
ucts regarded as necessities by the consum er and selling w ithin a price 
range that keeps them  clear o f  com petition. It would seem likely that 
there was a wide and growing differential between British and local 
prices80 (along the coasts and better highways, at least); that even m oder- 
ate-to-high tariffs failed to  obliterate this differential; and that the Brit­
ish, being unenthusiastic traders in these parts, still left them selves a 
good  deal o f  slack in the market.
Seventh, a distinguishing com m ent is necessary on this category o f “the 
British”. O ne should separate the London and M anchester British -  the 
ministers, investors, manufacturers, and chambers o f com merce who ran 
the body politic and the econom y and w ho articulated their global per­
spectives on the m aximisation o f trade and profit — from the American 
British w ho actually lived and w orked in the counting houses and consu­
lates o f the new republics and who were much too  far from hom e to be 
considered mere agents. The London and M anchester British took  a
79 Albert (1983: 27) observes that “throughout Latin America the groups opposing 
freer trade were generally those m ost concerned with preserving the established 
social and political order.”
80 Hobsbawm (1969:76) suggests that the price o f 1 lb o f spun cotton in Britain fell 
from 2s 6d in 1812 to 11 l/4d in 1832. See also McGreevey (1971: 38).
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detached and som ew hat w ithering view o f  Spanish America, wishing it 
had m ore to  offer, and loftily preaching the virtues o f  political order and 
econom ic liberalism. The American British, however, were the com para­
tive handful who had m ade a personal, commercial com m itm ent. Theirs 
w ere the voices that the British diplom atic representatives had in their 
ears when they penned  their elegant and usually futile letters to  local 
ministers. T he Foreign Office, possibly eight or nine m onths away by 
return, was no useful source o f instruction on proper reactions to som e 
new  tariff schedule. That, alm ost certainly, is another reason why the 
com plaints were very measured. H enderson, O ’Leary, W ilson, and others 
were, for the m ost part, spokesm en for small num bers o f  British traders. 
All were alert to  local prejudice and interest. The merchants, along with 
o ther foreigners, were usually operating well below m arket-saturation 
point. The days o f  g lut belonged only to the mid-1820s. The tariff was 
rarely defined as the m ake-or-break issue, the marginal increm ent o f cost 
that would lose them  their custom. They were likely to  be just as con­
cerned, if  not m ore so, by high transport charges, fluctuations in 
exchanges, forced loans, and the disposition o f  armies.
T he drift o f  analysis carries us to som ew hat negative conclusions on the 
tariff. These, however, m ust be offered cautiously, given the analytical 
difficulties o f the subject and the fragmentary and impressionistic charac­
ter o f much o f  the available inform ation. There was, w ithout question, a 
high degree o f economic independence (o f  a n o t especially salutary sort) 
between 1820 and 1850. Trading and investm ent figures provide elo­
quen t testim ony to  the Bolivarian states’ detachm ent from the British 
economy. Imperialism, even on the slack definition offered earlier, seems 
a m ost inappropriate term  to apply to  the area’s external relations. But 
the evidence to  hand does not suggest that tariffs were particularly deci­
sive in all this, partly because o f  the great obstructive pow er o f o ther ele­
m ents in the com pound trade barrier (m ost notably political instability 
and transport difficulties), and partly because so many duties w ere levied 
for revenue purposes and as such were no t designed to  depress trade. 
Even allowing for frequent discrepancies between objective and result, it 
seems unlikely that British merchants were very seriously inconven­
ienced by im port duties. They certainly did no t squeal very much. The 
tariff serves well as flag-like attestation o f  national political autonomy, 
and is im portant as such, but its impact on trade, in our circumstances o f 
low  elasticity o f  supply and dem and for textiles, appears not to  have been 
very great. Its significance lies m ore in its revelations about internal 
configurations o f political power.
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These low, trade-encouraging elasticities were, incidentally, a clear func­
tion o f economic backwardness. They arose from a systemic vulnerability 
to  foreign intrusion, only marginally affected by the tariff and left under­
exploited by the m etropolis because o f  other blocking forces in the com ­
pound  trade barrier. W here som e o f these im pedim ents eased signifi­
cantly after mid-century, the vulnerability became dangerously exposed. 
T he tariff, therefore, was no t the fashioner o f  our interim perium . N or 
was it part o f any Listian econom ic nationalism, protectionist features 
notw ithstanding. It was a hum drum  byproduct o f postcolonical milita­
rism, political expediency, and bureaucratic and fiscal deficiency. It bore 
all the hallmarks o f new-state governm ent while contributing little to 
new-state independence.
